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COM(82)  732  final PROPOSAL  FOR  A COUNCIL  DECISION  ADOPTING  NEW  PROVISIONS  RELATING  TO 
CHAPTER  VI  "SUPPLIES"  OF  THE  TREATY  ESTABLISHING  THE  EUROPEAN  ATOMIC 
ENERGY  COMMUNITY 
1.  Over  the  Last  twenty-five  years,  far-reaching  developments,  both 
quantitative  and  qualitative,  have  taken  place  in  industry  and  trade  as 
regards  materials  and  services  for  the  nuclear  fuel  cycle.  The  quantitative 
developments  can  be  measured  in  terms  of  the  contribution  of  the  nuclear 
industry to electricity generation  :  it  now  exceeds  20%  on  average,  for  the 
Community  as  a  whole,  and  will  continue  to  grow  in  the  years  to  come.  The 
qualitiative developments  have  been  marked  by  two  apparently  opposing 
tendencies  :  on  the  one  hand,  production of  and  in  consequence  trade  in 
nuclear  materials  has  become  increasingly  commonplace,  whilst,  on  the other, 
political  interventions  by  public  authorities,  mainly  for  reasons  connected 
with  the  non-proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons,  have  become  more  frequent. 
2.  The  situation  in  the  nuclear  sector  today  is  thus  very different  from  when 
the  Euratom  Treaty  was  signed.  To  take  account  of  this,  the  Commission 
considers  it advisable  to  amend  those  provisions  of  the Treaty  which  govern 
Community  supplies  of  nuclear  materials.  The  Commission's  initiative has 
been  very  carefully considered.  It  is  in  conformity  with  the  Letter  and 
spirit of  the  Euratom  Treaty,  which  explicitly provides  for  the  possibility 
of  amending  Chapter  VI  by  means  of  a  simplified procedure. 
3.  Positive  results  have  certainly been  obtained  under  the  present  system;  but 
the  evolution  of  nuclear  industry and  trade  has  led  to the  continuing 
development  of  practices  not  in  conformity  with  the  basic  rule  of  the 
system,  namely  the  exclusive  right  of  the  Euratom  Supply  Agency  to  make 
purchases  and  sales.  In  its present  form,  Chapter  VI  gives  rise  to  both  a 
Legal  problem  of  non-conformity  with  the  Law  by  its subjects,  and  to  a 
political  and  economic  problem  of  increasingly obvious  Lack  of  correspondence 
with  the  realities of  the  market  in  nuclear materials  and  fuel  services. 
4.  Proposals  to amend  the provisions  of  Chapter  VI  have  already  been  made  on 
two  occasions  in  the  past<*>.  Those  attempts  failed;  but,  since  the 
nuclear  industry  has  meanwhile  attained  genuine  industrial  and  commercial 
maturity,  the  facts  of  the  situation are  now  different,  being  both  clearer 
and  more  stablP..  That  is  why  the  Commission  believes that,  given  an  objective 
analysis  of  the  facts  and  an  effort  of  mutual  comprehension,  it should  be 
possible  to  reach  agreement  on  its  new  proposal. 
5.  In  preparing  this proposal,  the  Commission  has  made  a  point  of  seeking  the 
opinions  of  Member  States  and  industry. 
It  has  held  a  series  of  detailed discussions  with  the national  administrations. 
And  it  has  consulted  the  nuclear  industry  (producers  of  nuclear  materials  and 
services,  and  electricity producers),  both  within  the  framework  of  the 
Consultative  Committee  of  the  Euratom  Supply  Agency  and  by  meahs  of  ad  hoc 
meetings. 
(*)In  1964  and  again  in  1970,  the  Commission  put  forward  proposals  aimed  at 
instituting greater flexibility  in  respect  of  the  Agency's  monopoly. 2 
6.  These  consultations  have  contributed  substantially to  the  identification 
of  the  problems  to  be  solved,  and  the  Commission  has  Largely  taken  account 
of  their  results  in preparing this  communication.  But  the  opinions 
expressed  about  possible  solutions  were  often divergent  and  sometimes 
contradictory.  So,  where  no  common  denominator  could  be  found,  the 
Commission  has  made  a  choice. 
7.  The  Commission  based  its deliberations  on  the  principle  that  the 
fundamental  tasks  of  the  Community  are  and  remain  those  defined  in  Article  2 
of  the  Treaty,  in  particular paragraphs  (d)  and  (g)  thereof,  namely  to 
"ensure  that  all  users  in  the  Community  receive  a  regular  and  equitable 
supply  of  ores  and  nuclear  fuels"  and  to  "ensure  wide  commercial  outlets 
and  access  to  the  best  technical  facilities  by  the  creation of  a  common 
market  in  specialised materials  and  equipment  ••• ". 
Consequently  the  proposed  amendment  of  Chapter  VI  relates  solely  to  the 
modalities  for  fulfilling  these  fundamental  tasks  and  does  not  call  into 
question  the  application  of  the  other  Chapters  of  the  Treaty. 
8.  The  Commission  has  moreover  taken  the  view  that  the  new  provisions  must 
allow  the  nuclear  industry  the  greatest  possible  freedom  of  action  to 
enable  it to  assume  its  new  role  to  the full,  and  must  at  the  same  time 
provide all  guarantees  necessary  to  ensure  that  the  behaviour  of  the  Member 
States,  undertakings  and  individuals  concerned  could  not  in  any  way 
prejudice  regular  and  equitable  supplies  to all users. 
9.  Starting from  these  considerations,  the  proposed  system  does  away  with  the 
commercial  monopoly  accorded  to  the  Supply  Agency  and  embraces  the  following 
basic  elements  : 
- the  principle of  the unity  of  the  Community  market; 
- the  Community's  competence  on  the  international  Level; 
- the  implementation  of  certain specific  solidarity measures  aimed  chiefly 
at  ensuring  the security of  supplies; 
the  definition  of  the  Agency's  new  role,  the  main  aim  being  to  ensure 
market  transparency; 
- supervision  of  compliance  with  the  new  provisions. 
In  conformity  with  the  Community's  aims  and  existing practice,  the  new 
supply  system  is,  moreover,  expressly  confined  to  civiL  and  non-explosive 
uses  of  nuclear  energy.  This  means,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the  system  covers 
all  nuclear  materials  allocated  for  such  uses,  even  if  they  are  not  subject 
to  an  undertaking  that  they  will  be  used  for  such  purposes  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  that  it does  not  concern  materials  which  have  not  yet  been  so  allocated, 
even  provisionally. 3 
10.  The  principle of  market  unity 
(a)  The  Community  must  guarantee  that  no  restriction on  the free  movement  of 
nuclear  materials  within  the  Community  be  either decided  on  or  applied 
outside  the  Community  framework. 
Strict observance  of  this principle  is essential  in  order  to  ensure 
regular  and  equitable  supplies  to all  users,  while  avoiding any 
discrimination  where  they  are  concerned.  It also  has  obvious 
advantages  for  the  Community's  nuclear  industry  as  a  whole.  A genuine 
nuclear  common  market,  operating  without  barriers, will  permit  those 
Member  States  which  do  not  possess  a  complete  nuclear  cycle  to  turn  to 
those of  their partners  who  do,  without  feeling  that  it  would  be  more 
prudent  to  secure  supplies  by  acquiring their  own  complete  cycles,·which 
would  call  for  Lengthy  Lead  times  and  considerable  investment,  often out 
of all  proportion  to  the  size  of  their nuclear  programmes.  Smooth 
operation of  the  market  will  also  enable  those  Member  States  with 
complete  cycles  to  find  guaranteed  outlets  in  the  other Member  States, 
thus  opening  up  an  industry  which  is particularly  well  suited  to  export 
trade. 
The  application of  Community  safeguards  pursuant  to  Chapter  VII  of  the 
Euratom  Treaty and  the  Verification  Agreements  concluded  in  this field 
with  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  in  Vienna  enables  the 
Community  as  a  whole  to assume  the  responsibilities  inherent  in  a  system 
of  free  intra-Community  movement  of  nuclear materials. 
(b)  The  principce  of  market  unity  is  embodied  in  a  general,  automatic 
prohibition on  any  restriction on  transfers  of  materials  within  the 
Community  or  on  imports  from  outside the  Community,  and  on  any  conditions 
governing  use  and  storage  within  the  Community. 
This  "special  Law"  for  the  field  of  nuclear  supplies  does  notp  however, 
cover  barriers  (for  example,  certain abuses  of  dominant  position,  certain 
price practices, etc.)  which  are  not  real  restrictions  on  transfers  or 
conditions  governing  use  and  storage.  The  rules  of  the  EEC  Treaty 
governing  competition are  therefore applicable  to  such  barriers.  The 
application  of  both  systems  does  not  pose  any  particular  problems,  since 
the  special  law  takes  precedence  over  the provisions  of  the  EEC  Treaty. 
(c)  Excepti~ns to  the  general  prohibition mentioned  above  may,  however,  be 
justified,  given  the  special  precautions  needed  for  nuclear  trade  to 
ensure  in particular that,  within  the  Community,  the  public  authorities 
control  the  way  in  which  materials are used,  and  to  respond,  in the 
context  of  external  relations,  to  the  legitimate  concerns  of  outside 
suppliers. 
To  ensure  that  such  exceptions  are  compatible  with  the  task  assigned  to 
the  Community  under  Article  2  of  the  Treaty,  it is  however  important 
that  they  be  implemented  only  within  a  Community  framework,  so  that 
uncoordinated  interventions  by  Member  States  and  operators,  which  may  be 
contrary to market  unity,  are  avoided. 4 
To  this  end,  the  proposed  new  system  makes  provision  for  the  Commission 
to establish,  by  means  of  regulations,  rules  governing  conditions  for 
transfers  of  materials  within  the  Community  and  imports  from  outside 
the  Community,  together  with  conditions  for  use  and  storage  within  the 
Community.  There  should  however  be  a  possibility for  any  Member  State 
to  refer  such  a  regulation  to  the  Council.  To  facilitate  adoption  of 
the  system,  it might  be  desirable  for  an  initial  regulation  concerning 
these  conditions  to  enter  into  force  at  the  same  time  as  the  new 
system  itself. 
11.  The  powers  of  the  Community  at  international  level 
(a)  Given  the  Community
1 s  dependence  on  third  countries  for  certain 
fundamental  aspects  of  nuclear  supplies,  and  the  restrictions  which  such 
countries  tend  to  apply  to nuclear  trade,  regular  and  equitable  supplies 
for  all  users  within  the  Community  could  be  prejudiced  as  a  result  of 
the  behaviour  of  such  countries. 
To  mitigate this  risk,  there  must  be  a  common  attitude  towards  third 
countries.  This  should  preferably find  expression  in  the  conclusion 
of  agreements  by  the  Community,  in  order to  turn  the  Community  dimension 
to  best  account. 
Cases  may  however  arise  in  which  the  Community  might  not  be  able,  or 
might  not  wish,  to  conclude  an  agreement. 
If  this  were  so,  the  Commission  would  authorise  the  conclusion  of  bilateral 
agreements  by  Member  States,  in  Line  with  existing administrative 
jurisprudence. 
The  Commission•s  authorisation  is  a  necessary  condition.  It  requires  that 
these  agreements  be  in  conformity  with  the  Treaty,  in particular  the 
principle of  the  unity  of  the  market,  and  that  the  possibility of 
incorporating  such  agreements  in  Community  agreements  be  accepted. 
In  the  existing  system,  the  international  competence  of  the  Community  is 
based  upon  a  monopoly.  Because  of  the  ending  of  that  monopoly,  the 
Commission  proposed  that  new  ruLes  should  establish  explicitly the 
Community
1 s  right  to  conclude  international  supply  agreements. 
(b)  International  action  by  the  Community  must  also  be  considered  from 
another  fundamental  angle,  namely  that  of  exports  from  the  Community. 
In  the  present  system,  Article  59  stipulates that  such  exports  are 
subject  to  authorisation  by  the  Commission,  which  verifies  their 
conformity  with  the  general  interests of  the  Community. 
The  principle of  prior authorisation  of  exports  by  the  Commission  must 
be  retained  in  the  new  system  for  the  same  reasons  that  Led  to  its 
inclusion  in  the  existing  Chapter  VI. 5 
The  object  of  such  authorisation  is not  simply  to verify  that  the exports 
under  consideration are  not  Liable  to  jeopardise  the  supplies  of  other. 
users  in  the  Community  by  removing  materials  which  are  needed  to meet 
their  requirements.  If  such  were  the  case,  the  authorisation  would, 
in practice,  take  the  form  of  automatic  approval,  except  in  situations 
of  shortage. 
Authorisation  is necessary  also  in  order  to  check  whether  the  exports 
are  in  conformity  with  international  commitments  entered  into by  the 
Community  concerning  the  materials  exported,  and  in  order  to  prevent 
exports  taking place  which  could  be  extremely prejudicial  to  the 
Community's  good  relations  with  certain third  countries~ 
It is because  of  the  very  nature  of  the  materials  exported  that  special 
treatment  is necessary  :  the  "London  Guidelines"(*)  provide  proof  -
if proof  were  needed  - that  exporting States,  whether  or  not  they  possess 
nuclear  weapons,  recognise  the  need  for  collective discipline. 
On  the  other  hand  the  nature  of  these materials  has  as  its corollary  a 
position  under  which  authorisation by  the  Commission  of  exports  is  not 
exclusive.  Each  Member  State  can  in  fact  establish its own  system of 
authorisation;  it  is  thus  possible  that differences  of  appreciation 
between  the  Member  State  concerned  and  the  Commission  could  arise. 
The  Commission  takes  the  view  however  that  such  differences of  view  are 
very  improbable  as  they  will  tend  to be  averted  by  the  work  carried out 
on  a  continuing basis  in  the political  cooperation  framework. 
In  the  existing  Chapter  VI,  Article  75  stipulates that  the  provisions  of 
that  Chapter  - and  therefore also the  prior authorisation  rule -do not 
apply  in particular to materials  imported  for  processing,  conversion or 
shaping  within  the  Community  and  intended  to  be  re-exported  to  the 
original  undertaking  nor  to  materials  exported outside  the  Community  for 
such  operations  and  intended  to  be  re-imported. 
There  is  no  reason  to  retain  such  exceptions  in  the  new  system,  since  the 
existing  Chapter  VI  is  based  on  the  monopoly  principle  and  the  main  aim 
of  Article  75  is to  exclude  the  operations  described  from  the  Agency's 
exclusive  right  to enter  into  supply  contracts. 
In  the  absence  of  a  monopoly,  this exclusion  is  no  longer  justified and 
there  is  no  reason  why  materials  exported or  imported  for  the  sole  purpose 
of  conversion  should  be  treated differently  from  a  prior export 
authorisation  standpoint  :  the  reasons  that  justify verification of 
the  political opportuneness  of  exports  are  v~ild for all  types  of  exports. 
(*)Guidelines  for  the  export  of  nuclear  material,  equipment  and  technology 
(Doc.  INFCIRC/254  of  the  IAEA,  February  1978). 6 
This  superv1s1on  could  not  however  in  any  case  have  as  a  consequence 
the  appropriation  by  the  Community  of  materials  which  it  does  not  own, 
namely,  those  from  outside  the  Community  which  are  to  be  processed  in 
the  Community  and  are  to  be  returned,  either to the  original  individual 
or  undertaking  or  to  any  other  recipient  situated outside  the  Community, 
and  so  designated  by  this  individual  or  undertaking. 
Besides  for  these  materials,  authorisation  would  be  given  under  the 
processing  contract  itself and  thus  would  cover,  subject  to  any 
conditions  which  the  Commission  could  impose,  all  the deliveries  which 
arise  from  it  and  which  are  very  often  spread  over  several  years. 
12.  Specific  solidarity measures 
The  risksof  disturbances  that  may  prejudice  the  regularity of  nuclear  fuel 
supplies  are  Less  than  those  affecting supplies  of  fossil  fuels, 
particularly petroleum products.  The  main  reason  for  this  is  that  nuclear 
fuels  are  easier  to  store.  Current  stocks  of  uranium  in  the  Community  are 
enough  to  cover  requirements  for  about  four  years. 
It  cannot  however  be  ruled  out  that  disturbances  of  the  nuclear  fuel  market 
will  occur  in the  future. 
It  is therefore essential  to have  the ability to  take  measures  at  Community 
Level  aimed  both  at  forestalling  such  disturbances  and  at  remedying  them. 
To  this  end,  the  proposed  system 
-provides consultative machinery,  intended  to  facilitate  cooperation 
between  Community  investors; 
maintains  Community  financial  support  for  uranium  prospecting  and  extends 
it to  cover  the territories  of  non-member  States; 
-provides the  possibility of  establishing decentralised  strategic  stocks 
and  of  taking appropriate  action  as  regards  prices  and  import  controls  in 
the  event  of  imbalances  of  supply  and  demand. 
13.  The  new  role  of  the  Supply  Agency 
Despite  the  abolition  of  the  monopoly,  the  Commission  plans  to  keep  the 
Supply  Agency  in  being  :  the  Agency  will  have  to  continue  to fulfil  its 
other  dutie~which experience  has  shown  to  be  worthwhile,  and  it  seems 
particularly well  suited  for  carrying out  certain  new  tasks  within  the 
proposed  system. 
The  Agency  will  continue  to  keep  the  Commission,  Member  States  and  operators 
informed  of  the  current  market  situation and  trends,  basing  itself on  its 
knowledge  of  the  contracts  and  data  sent  to it and  on  surveys  conducted  by  it. 
The  Agency  will  also  continue  to  conclude  supply  contracts  when  provision  is 
expressly made  for  this  in  international  agreements  concluded  by  the 
Community. 7 
The  Agency  will  examine  the  contracts  submitted  to it to  see  whether  they 
conform  to the  specific  rules  of  Chapter  VI  and  will  draw  the  attention of 
the  Commission,  within  a  period  to  be  strictly observed,  to  any  objections 
to  which  their provisions  might  give  rise.  In  that  context,  it will  also 
be  free  to  fulfil  an  advisory  function  vis-a-vis  any  operators  who  choose  to 
submit  their  contracts  in draft  before  signature. 
This  advisory  function  could  cover  only  conformity of  the  provisions  of  the 
contract  with  Community  Law,  to  the  exclusion  of  these  aspects  of  the  contract 
which  are  in  fact  commercial  or  industrial.  The  Agency  will  receive  contracts 
from  all operators,  on  a  confidential  basis,  will  be  able  only  to  use  them 
to  assess  the  market  for  the  benefit  of  the  Community  and  of  all  operators 
and  will  have  to  refrain  from  any  interference  in  the  commercial  and 
industrial  field,  which  will  henceforth  be  for  the  initiative  of  operators. 
The  Agency  will  furthermore  be  charged  with  the  task  of  implementing  most  of 
the  solidarity measures  concerning  security  of  supply  and,  generally  speaking, 
with  any  specific  tasks  the  Commission  may  assign  to it. 
14.  Compliance  with  the  new  provisions 
In  order  to  ensure  that  the  new  provisions  of  Chapter  VI  are  respected,  it 
is necessary  to  install  a  clear  and  dissuasive  system  of  sanctions  and 
specific  arrangements  for  supervision. 
Under  the  system  of  sanctions  : 
contracts  which  are  not  in  conformity  with  the  principle  of  the unity  of 
tbe market,  or  with  an  international  agreement  concluded  by  the  Community, 
or  with  any  solidarity measures,  shall  be  null  and  void; 
- the  Commission  shall  be  entitled  to  impose  fines  and  penalties for  any 
infringement  of  the  rules  of  Chapter  VI. 
Under  the  specific  arrangements  for  supervision 
-the full  text  of  all  supply  contracts  will  be  communicated  ex  post  to the 
Agency  within  15  days  of  their  conclusion;  if  no  objections  are  raised  by 
the  Commission  within  one  month  from  the  time  of  communication,  the 
contracts  will  be  deemed  in  conformity  with  the  specific  rules  of 
Chapter  VI; 
- on-the-spot  verifications  can  be  made  to  ensure  that  the  obligation to 
communicate  the  abovementioned  contracts  has  been  fulfilled. 
It  does  not  seem  desirable  to  Lay  down  exceptions  to  the  rule  of  ex  post 
communication  for  particular  categories  of  contracts,  since  infringements 
of  the  new  provisions  of  Chapter  VI,  particularly the  principle of  the  unity 
of  the  market,  may  occur  in  the  case  of  any  commercial  transaction  and  have 
repercussions  on  subsequent  transactions. 8 
The  Commission  proposes  that  contracts  should  be  communicated  ex  post 
rather  than  ex  ante  so  as  to underline  the  fact  that,  under  the  new  system, 
it  is  the  operators  who  have  the  prime  responsibility  for  supplies:  this 
means  that  they  are  free  to  negotiate  and  conclude  contracts  without  Let 
or  hindrance  a,!d  the  Community  authorities  Y.Ji  L  L only  intervene  in  cases  of 
infringement  of  Community  Law. 
A requirement  to  communicate  contracts  ex  ante  would  be  a  residue  from  the 
former  system  of  Agency  monopoly  and  would  not  correspond  to  any  real  need. 
Any  operators  who  so  wish  will,  however,  still be  able  to  send  their  .draft 
contracts  to  the  Agen~y ex  ante  and  thus  make  sure,  by  prior  consultation 
with  the  Community  institutions,  that  they are  fully  consistent  with 
Community  Law. 
Finally it  should  be  noted  that  systematic  control  of  contracts  by  the 
Agency  is  aimed  solely at  ensuring  that  they  are  in  conformity  with  the 
specific  provisions  of  Chapter  VI  and  with  international  agreements  concluded 
by  the  Community;  in  particular  it  will  not  be  concerned  with  observance  of 
EEC  Treaty  rules  on  competition,  which  will  apply  to  the  nuclear  sector  once 
the  Agency's  monopoly  is abolished.  There  is  no  reason  to set  up  a  special 
system  for  monitoring  observance  of  the  rules  on  competition  in  this  sector. 
The  Commission  has  endeavoured  to  propose  a  system  that  wiLL  cause  the  Least 
trouble  to operators  while  at  the  same  time  enabling  it to ensure  that  the 
fundamental  requirements  of  the  Treaty  are  observed. 
15.  The  information  on  the  proposed  system  set  out  above  is  confined  to  the 
main  points. 
For  a  more  detailed  study  of  the  Commission's  proposals,  reference  should 
be  made  to  Annex  1  :  "Historical  review  and  main  featur~s of  the  proposed 
system"  and  to  the  text  of  the  revised  Chapter  VI  (Annex  2).  Furthermore, 
comments  on  each  individual  Article are  set  out  in  a  document  prepared  by 
the  Commission  and  forwarded  separately. 
Conclusion 
16.  The  supply  system  outlined  above  would  enable  the  main  objectives  of  the 
Euratom  Treaty  concerning  supplies  to  be  achieved  and  yet  give  economic 
operators  the  autonomy  they  are  entitled to  expect,  given  the  way  the  nuclear 
sector  has  developed.  It  is  also  fully  compatible  with  the  international 
commitments  made  by  the  Community  and/or  its Member  States  in  respect  of 
supply,  use,  movement  and  control  of  nuclear  materials. 
17.  The  Commission  therefore  invites  the  Council  to  adopt  the  attached draft 
decision adopting  new  provisions  relating to  Chapter  VI  of  the  Treaty 
establishing the  European  Atomic  Energy  Community. 
-oOo-Proposal  for  a  Council  Decision  adopting  new  prov1s1ons  relatin9 
to  Chapter  VI  "Supplies"  of  the  Treaty  establishing the  European 
Atomic  Energy  Community 
"Historical  review  and  main  features  of  the  proposed  system" I.  INTROIUCTION 
1.  In its communication entitled "The  development  of an energy strategy 
for the Community"*,  the  Commission put forward  a  set of guidelines 
intended to estaolish a  pattern for the individual behaviour of operators 
and to promote  the  convergence of national policies so  that,  special 
situations apart,  the  overall  situation of the  Community  with respect to 
the difficulties affecting the  supply of energy would  steadily improveo 
In this regard,  the  need  to expand  the utilization of nuclear energy was 
once  again stressed and  the  Commission stated, inter alia, that it would 
make  further efforts to find  a  solution to the problems that still 
existed where  supplies of nuclear fuel were  concerned. 
2.  MOre  recently, in its communication entitled "An  energy strategy for 
the  Community:  the nuclear aspects"**,  the  Commission reviewed  the 
various  aspects of utilizing nuclear energy that are  of interest to the 
Community  and  its Member  States.  At  its meeting on 13  July,  the  Council 
broadly agreed with that analysis from the standpoint of the  macroeconomic 
aspects. 
As  regards  the  problems facing the  Community  in the  accomplishment  of the 
fundamental  tasks  assigned to it under Article 2  of the  Euratom Treaty, 
and  in particular paragraphs  (d)  and  (g)  thereof,  the  Commission put 
forward  in the  abovementioned document  guidelines that  seemed  to it likely 
to open the way  towards  a  solution which would  simultaneously be  compatible 
with the Treaty, the main interests of the Member  States  and  those  of the 
operators. 
These  guidelines,  moreover,  included substantial amendments  to the present 
provisions  governing supplies, which  could not  be  effected with the 
requisite legal certainty solely by  an interpretation of those provisions. 
The  Commission  thus  came  out in favour of amending them formally. 
In respect of this important subject, which goes  far beyond  the  macroeconomic 
aspects,  the  Council  took note  of the fact that the  Commission would  place a 
proposal  before it;  the Commission is now  complying with that undertaking. 
3·  Where  the body of this document  is concerned, it starts with a  brief 
description of the conception of  the  original Chapter VI,  the results 
obtained  and  the difficulties encountered in applying it and  of the previous 
attemtps  to amend  its provisions  {Section II);  it then presents the  overall 
conception of the  new  system proposed and its most  important features 
(Section III). 
*  **COM(81)540  final,  1  October  1981. 
COM(82)36  final,  9  February  1982. - 2-
II.  ORIGINAL  CHAPTER  VI 
A~  Historical  context  and  basic orinciples 
4.  The  present  Chapter VI was  devised in the  mid-1950s,  as  the 
Suez  cr1s1:>  (1956)  was  makinq  clear  Europe's vulnerability where 
oil supplies were  concerned.  Nuclear energy was  even then regarded 
as  a  serious alternative to oil, but  on condition that  a  large-scale 
technological  and  industrial breakthrough was  achieved  and  that access 
to the  source  material,  uranium ore,  could be  reasonably guaranteed. 
The  nuclear industry was  in its infancy in the countries that were 
about  to  form  the European  Atomic  Energy  Community;  at the  close of 
the  1950s,  the nuclear power  generating capacity installed and  under 
construction hardly exceeded  50  1We*;  little uranium had  by  then 
been discovered and  -the  fundamental  options relating to  reactor 
concepts  and  industrial strategies had  not yet  been adopted.  At 
that time,  the  United  States dominated  the nuclear industry, 
particularly the  fuel  sector. 
That  situation motivated  the  choice of  the  system established by the 
original  Chapter VI. 
The  authors of the  Treaty,  moreover,  took full  account  of the fact that 
the nuclear  supply situation as  they knew  it was  only at an initial 
stage.  For this reason,  they expressly provided for a  means  of amending 
the provisions laid down  at that time  by  means  of a  simplified procedure. 
5·  The  fundamental  task of the  Community  where  nuclear supplies are 
concerned is  described in Article  2  of the Treaty.  Chapter VI 
lays down  the  procedures in accordance with which  the  Community is to 
fulfil that task.  The  present provisions of that  Chapt.er  are  based  on 
the  principle of equal  access to  resources  and  on  the implementation of 
a  common  supply policy. 
*  At  the  present time,  an installed capacity of  50  000  MWe  produces 
over  2~1c of the electricity consumed  in the Community.  B,y  the  end 
of the  century,  the  contribution of nuclear energy to electricity 
generation could exceed  50;~ in certain countries,  and  even 80;'!o  in 
one  of them. - 3-
To  that end,  the Treaty created a  veritable European monopoly  and 
entrusted it to the  Supply  Agency  which is under the  supervision 
of the  Commission. 
Apart  from certain derogations,  the  Commission has the right of option 
on all Community  production and  an exclusive right to conclude all 
supply contracts. 
A procedure for balancing supply against demand  is intended to enable 
the users'  requirements to be  satisfied in accordance with the 
principle of equal  access;  in the  event  of a  shortage,  that procedure 
may result in distribution measureso 
All  exports of nuclear materials from  the  Comrmmi ty are subject, with 
a  few  exceptions,  to authorization by the Commission,  which ensures 
that the  general interests of the  Community  are  safeguarded. 
The  Commission  may  give financial 
support  to uranium prospecting programmes  in the territories of Member 
States;  furthermore,  central stocks  may  be built up by the  Commission 
or the  Agency. 
The  other aspects of  the  common  suooly  policy  are  inherent  in  the  Agency's 
activities in the exercise of its monopoly;  in particular, the  Agency, 
when  making use of its exclusive right,  may decide on the geographical 
origin of the supplies outside the  Community. 
B.  Favourable results and principal difficulties of application 
6.  The  present Chapter VI  enables the Community  to obtain important 
results: 
in relations with non-Community countries, the  monopoly  gave legal 
substance  to the Community's  powers  to  conclude international 
agreements  concerning supplies of nuclear materials;  this was  the 
basis of very important  agreements  associating the  Community  with 
countries  such  as  the USA,  Canada  and  Australia; 
- as regards  commercial  relations, the  Agency,  in the  case of the 
contracts subjected to its supervision, has made  every effort to 
prevent restrictions being applied to Community  transfers so that 
the principle of the unity of  the  market would  be  respected; 
in addition,  the  Agency  has been instrumental in assisting the 
operators in the  Community  by  providing them with Community  support 
in securing supplies for  them  (for example,  American enrichment 
services or enriched uranium)  or by improving the condi  tiona of 
supply; - 4  -
~as regards  common  policy,  the  Commission's  activities  in  support  of 
uranium  prospecting  programmes  in  the territories of  Member  States 
ha~made it possible, firstly,  to  stimulate  such  programmes  and, 
secondly,  to  di~cover interesting geological  indications and 
appreciable deposits. 
7.  The  serious  problems  to  which  the  application  of  Chapter  VI  has 
given  rise  since  the  beginning  should  not  however  be  underestimated. 
Since  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty,  the  application  of  certain 
provisions  of  Chapter  VI  to  uranium  supplies  has  given  rise  to 
difficulties.  A practical  solution  makes  it possible  to  surmount 
them  :  the  temporary  establishment  in  a  Regulation  of  the  exemption 
of  natural  uranium  supplies  from  the  procedure  for  balancing  supply 
and  demand,  accompanied  by  a  notification of  contracts  to  the  Agency, 
which  is  equivalent  to  conclusion  of  the  contracts  by  the  Agency 
itself,  if  no  objections  are  raised  in  a  specific  period. 
The  exclusive  right  to  conclude  contracts  which  the  Treaty  has  Laid 
down  as  an  essential  procedure  to  exercise this  monopoly  is  thereby 
broadly  transformed  into  a  system  of  supervision of  contracts  negotiated 
and  concluded  directly by  operators. 
In  this  context,  the  principle of  equal  access  to  resources  tends  to 
make  difficulties if it is  Literally  interpreted.  Indeed,  it has 
the  effect  of  restraining  competition  between  suppliers  and  of 
dissuading  the  purchasers  from  taking  measures  themselves  to  strengthen 
their  own  guarantees  of  supplies. 
The  right  of  option  has  been  exercised  only  implicitly  and  imperfectly 
through  the  Agency's  participation  in  the  conclusion  of  contracts. 
The  procedure  involving  the  centralised  balancing  of  supply  against 
demand  has,  in  the  course  of  time,  proved  to  be  increasingly  inappropriate 
to the  conditions  obtaining  on  the  nuclear  materials  market. 
Finally,  the  field  of  intervention  by  the  Agency  and  the  Commission  has 
been  reduced  by  a  controversial  interpretation of  the  exceptions  laid 
down  in  Article  75  (processing,  conversion or  shaping  of  materials)  and 
in  Article  58,  paragraph  2  and  in  Article  62,  paragraph  2  (c)  (connected 
undertakings)  as  well  as  by  a  frequent  removal  from  the  Agency's  hold  of 
contracts  concluded  by  intermediaries,  a  category  not  expressly  Laid 
down  by  the  present  Chapter  VI  :there are still differences  between  the 
Commission  and  certain Member  States  on  the  scope  of  these articles. -5-
This  has  resulted  in  a  situation  in  which  the  conditions  of  the  market  in 
nuclear  fuel  materials  and  services  corresponds  less  and  less  i~  certain 
fundamental  aspects  with  the  present  rrovis1ons  of  chapter  VI. 
8.  The  rather unsatisfactory application of the present Chapter VI, 
if continued, would in all probability have increasingly harmful 
consequences: 
-the legal uncertainty resulting from  the present situation does  not 
create a  climate favourable  to initiatives on the part of the 
operators; 
it  is  likely to give rise to a  negative image  of the 
Treaty as  a  whole; 
since important  supply sectors  evade  Agency  superVl.BJ.on,  certain 
practices which  are  Likely  to  depress  intra-Community  trade  and  interfere 
with  supplies  to  users,  have  been  emerging,  both  in  respect  of  materials 
from  outside  the  Community  and  as  regards  those  of  internal 
origin  ;  in other words,  this situation could induce the 
Member  States to adopt incompatible  measures  both inside  and  outside 
the  Community  with  the result that certain users would  be in a 
privileged position at the  expense of  other operators; 
-the lack of Community  cohesion that could result from this would have 
deleterious effects on the  Community's  international activities, which· 
are essential in ensuring regular and equitable uranium supplies for 
all users. 
c.  Previous  attempts at amendment 
9•  In the light of the difficulties of application referred to above, 
the  Commission proposed to the  Council in 1964* an amendment  to Chapter VI 
which was  aimed,  on the  one  hand,  at reducing the  monopoly  and,  on the 
other hand,  at reinforcing activities in implementation of a  common 
policy;  the right of option r10uld  have  been dropped,  but  re-established 
by the  Council in the  event  of shortage,  and  the  exclusive right to 
conclude contracts conferred upon the  Agency would  have  been maintained, 
but its exercise would  have  been suspended by the Commission during 
"normal" periods. 
In accordance  with  the  second  paragraph of Article 76. -6-
Since  the  Council  found it impossible  to reach a  consensus 9  the 
Co~ssion 7  in 1970,  submitted  a  revised  and  simpler proposal which 
took account  of certain amendments  requested by  the Member  States; 
however, it did not differ in substance from  the  1964  proposal~ 
The  Council discussions were  once  again centred on the  Agency's 
commercial rights;  the  problem was  to determine whether they would 
be  maintained or done  away  with,  and,  in the latter case, if and 
under what  conditions they could be  re-established.  These 
discussions were  interrupted in 1973  during the first  enlargement 
of the  Community  in order to allow the  new  Member  States to become 
familiar with the details of the  mattero 
10e  In the meantime,  the  Court  of Justice  (1971)  ruled that, pending 
confirmation or revision of  Chapter VI,  that Chapter would  continue 
to apply in its entirety. 
11.  In 1973  and  1974 7  two  events profoundly influenced the  context 
in which  nuclear energy was  developing:  the  Yom  Kippur War,  with the 
oil supply crisis, which it provoked  and  which imparted additional 
urgency to the industrial development  of nuclear power  production so 
that it would  be  possible to  cope with the  energy challenge,  and the 
Indian atomic  explosion.  A consequence  of the  latter, for a 
relatively short time,  was  a  maFked  stiffening in the attitudes and 
policies of most  of the countries which export nuclear materials, 
:fuel  services  and  equipment in view of the threat of nuclear arms 
proliferation. 
Certain Governments, particularly the United  States Government,  came 
out in favour of putting a  stop to the development  of technologies 
concerned with the production and use  of plutonium for an indefinite 
period. 
As  regards  the aspects  more  particularly concerned with supplies,  the 
market,  which was  becoming increasingly like any other market under 
the effects of industrial maturity,  experienced the development  of 
state interventions  ~-shich,  in a  contradictory manner,  imposed 
conditions on sales and  restrictions on the use of materials that had 
been supplied or convertede 
12.  In parallel with these events,  the Euratom safeguards established 
in 1958  continued to expand in scope, which  mainly consisted of 
ensuring that the nuclear materials in the territories of the  Community 
Member  States would  not  be  diverted from the purposes for which it had 
been stated that they were  intended. 
In addition,  the  system for supervising nuclear materials established 
under the Non-Proliferation Treaty was  set up under the responsibility 
of the International Atomic  Energy Agency. - 1-
The  Community,  thus  subjected to joint international supervision of 
nuclear materials,  became  the region of the world most  thoroughly 
supervised in this respect. 
13o  It would  have been difficult in this troubled and  changing context, 
which  often exhibited contradictory aspects,  to resume discussions  on 
the Community  nuclear  supply system. 
14.  In .June  1979,  the Commission forwarded  to the Council  a  communication 
in which it set out  three possible solutions to the problems arising from 
Chapter VI:  confirmation,  revision and  interpretation, without,  however,  pro-
posing  a  specific approach at that  stageo 
15.  In July 1979,  France forwarded  a  memorandum  to the Council requesting 
the revision of Chapter VI  alo~~ the lines laid down  in the Treaty  and 
calling upon the Commission  to deal  with the matter;  that  propos~l was 
aimed  at doing  aw~ with the  Agency's right of option and  its right to 
conclude  contracts  ru1d  recommend  that the principle of  equal  access  be 
replaced  b,y  that of non-discrimination,  that the principle of  Commlh~ty 
preference be  adopted  and,  finally,  that the  common  policy measures to 
be decided  on  b.Y  the Council  be  expanded. 
In September  1979,  the Council  examined  the two  documents together  and 
noted that the Commission  would  submit  to it a  report  on  the subject  as 
soon  as it had  examined  the French proposal.  To  this end,  the Commission 
sought  the opinions of independent  experts and,  in February 1982, 
for•11arded  to the Council  the  communication referred to  in paragraph  (2) 
above,  in which it adopted  a  position in favour of the revision of 
Chapter VI  and  stated that it would  shortly  submit  specific proposals 
i.n that regard. 
III.  NEW  COMMUNITY  SUPPLY  SYSTEM 
A.  Overall  conception 
16.  The  Community  fuel-cycle  industry has now  reached maturity and  has 
acquired  a  structure which,  where  the  supply of nuclear  materi~ls is 
concerned,  makes  it possible to  app~ market  economy  rules to  the 
operators'  initiatives. 
For this reason,  the Community  no  longer requires interventionist 
mechanisms  such as the monopoly  and the balancing of  oupply  and  demand 
in order to  accomplish the task assigned to it under  Article 2,  and  in 
particular paragraph  (d)  thereof. -8-
17.  However,  the nuclear materials market  is and will continue to  be 
characterized by  numerous  interventions on the part of the public 
authorities. 
There is thus a  very real danger that, if there is no  Community 
discipline,  the trade in nuclear materials will be  subjected to 
increasingly numerous  unilateral constraints which are  completely 
contrary to the  concept  of regular and  equitable  supplies for all users 
in the Community  and which jeopardize the very existence of the nuclear 
common  market. 
18.  This proposal for  a  revision of Chapter VI  has been designed to 
avert that danger.  In other words,  it is aimed at  ensuring that the 
nuclear  supp~ ~stem does not  run counter to the  common  interest. 
19.  To  this end,  it is necessary for the Community: 
to  ensure that no  restrictions on the transfers of materials within 
the Community  and  on  imports from  outside the Community  and  no  conditions 
governing use  and  storage within the Community  (whether or not  such 
restrictions and  conditions are discriminatory)  are decided on outside 
the Community  framework;  this is the principle of the unity of the 
market; 
to retain its powers  in the field of external relations in order to: 
{a)  take advantage of its size to obtain satisfactory  supply 
conditions  and  to  prevent  non-community  countries from 
prejudicing the unity. of the Community  market; 
(b)  to  ensure tnat the behaviour of one  or other operator or Member 
State where  exports are  concerned is not  contrary to the general 
interests of the  Community; 
to safeguard the  option of taking specific solidarity measures with 
regard to  supply,  in particular to forestall market  disturbances or 
to remedy  them; 
to use the  Supply  Agency,  while modifying its role,  as a  privileged 
instrument to  implement  the  common  supply policy which derives from 
the new  provisions of Chapter VI; -9-
- to implement  an effective s.ystem  of supervision to ensure  compliance 
with the new  provisions. 
B.  Main  features 
20.  We  shall  confine ourselves here to providing further particulars 
of the aims  and  scope of the new  s.ystem  proposed in addition to the 
information already presented. 
For a  more  detailed  stu~ of that  s,ystemt  it is advisable to refer to 
the text of the proposal itself (Annex  2)  and to the a.rticle-b,y-article 
comments  set out  in a  report drawn  up  b,y  the Commission  and forwarded 
separately to the Council. 
21.  The  proposal  from  the  Comm~ssion first of all defines the constituent 
parts of the new  common  supply policy,  namely:  principle of the unity of 
the market,  exercise of the Community's powers at international level and 
adoption of specific solidarity measures. 
It specifies simultaneously that the Supply  Agency  is to contribute to 
the implementation of that policy. 
22.  The  supply policy as defined  above  concerns  only the  ta~~s of the 
Community  as  such,  independently of the role of the national policies 
which contribute,  to  a  considerable extent,  to ensuring supplies for the 
users. 
The  Community's  action supplements,  reinforces and  coordinates these 
policies,  while  simultaneously  en~uring that the.y  are compatible with 
the  common  interest. 
23.  As  regards the application of the new  system,  it is confined to 
civilian and non-explosive uses of nuclear materials in contrast with 
the original Chapter VI,  which  makes  no  distinction between uses.  This 
limitation is in conformity with the civilian nature of the Community's 
task,  such as emerges  from  the preamble  and  Article 1  of the Treaty. 
It implies that  arrangements for  supplies to be used for the manufacture 
of explosives or for militar,y  pur~oses will be made,  in accordance with 
current practice,  outside the  Community  framework. 
In conclusion,  the new  s.ystem  applies to all nuclear materials which 
have,  in fact,  been allocated for civilian uses,  even if they are not 
subject to  an undertaking to use  them  for peaceful purposes.  On  _the 
other hand,  it does not  apply to materials which  have  not yet  been 
allocated for  such purposes either definitively or provisionally. - 10-
24.  The  principle of the unity of the market  takes concrete form  as a 
general prohibition on all restrictions on transfers of materials within 
the Community  and  on  imports from  outside the Community  as well  as on all 
conditions governing use  and  storage within the Community,  except for 
those conditions/restrictions accepted  by the Community  in international 
agreements  in order to meet  the legitimate concerns of outside suppliers. 
25.  However,  owing to the special nature of nuclear materials, it has 
become  necessary to  authorize or even impose,  at Community  level,  certain 
conditions/restrictions other than those accepted in the  international 
agreements. 
26.  The  Community  procedure  envisaged for that purpose takes the form 
of Regulations to  be  adopted  b,y  the Commission,  the most  appropriate 
institution to take in an  impartial manner the decisions that are 
necessary in this regard;  the delicate nature of such Reguletions, 
moreover,  is sufficient justification for intervention b,y  the Council 
when  an appeal is made • 
27.  A  List  of  restrictions  that  could  be  covered  by  a  first  Regulation  in  this  field, 
includir~ special Community  provisions  concerning the use and  the 
transfer of plutonium  and  highly enriched uranium,  is presented  iri the 
report prepared by  the Commission  and  containing comments  on  each 
individual Article,  which was forwarded  separately to the Council. 
28.  The  general prohibition referred to in paragraph  (24)  above does 
not,  however,  cover barriers such as abuses of dominant  position and 
certain practices  •..n. th regard to prices where  these are not real 
restrictions on transfers or conditions governing use  and  storage. 
Since,  in this respect,  nuclear materials are not  sufficiently dif£erent 
from  other products to  justify specific competition rules,  the provisions 
of the  EEC  Treaty which  cover  competition are applicable for the purpose 
of preventing the occurrence of  such barriers.  ~  virtue of Article 232 
of the EEC  Treaty,  express reference in the new  text of Chapter VI  to 
these provisions would  not be necessary. - 11  -
However,  the Commission  considers it preferable to mention the 
provisions  in question explicitly for reasons of legal certainty,  that 
is to  s~, in order to avoid any dispute in the future regarding their 
applicability to  the field of nuclear supplies. 
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29.  ~  the  terms  of the original Chapter VI,  the international powers 
of the Community  with regard to the  supply of nuclear materials are not 
directly conferred,  but derive from  the Agency's monopolistic 
prerogatives in accordance with the principle of parallelism between 
external  powers  and  internal powers,  which is enshrined in Article  101 
of the Treaty. 
Revoking the monopoly  thus gives rise to the need for a  specific 
provision defining the Community's  powers to  conclude international 
agreements  concerning nuclear supplies. 
The  confirmation of these essential Community  powers is acco~panied b,y 
e  provision on procedure  based on Article 113 of the EEC  Treaty which 
l~s down  that the Commission,  when  conducting negotiations,  shall take 
account  of the opinions  and  expert  knowledge  of representatives of the 
Member  States. 
30.  Provision is also made  for cases in which the Community  either 
cannot  or does not  wish to conclude this type of agreement. 
In such cases, it is usual for the Member  State concerned to  be  able to 
take whatever measures  are necessary in order to  ensure  supplies for its 
users b,y  concluding bilateral  agreements with non-Community  countries. 
Authorization by the Commission  for  such  agreements is,  hov;ever, necessary. 
Pursuant  to Article  103  of  the  Treaty,  it  presupposes that 
the  agreements  in question are in conformity with the Treaty,  in particular 
with the principle of the unity of the market. 
In addition,  since this authorization is a  derogation from  one  of the 
basic principles of the new  Chapter VI,  special precautions are necessary, 
and  it must  be  explicitly ensured that the bilateral  agreement  can be 
incorporated in a  subsequent  Community  agreement. 
31o  As  regards  exports  of nuclear materials from  the Community,  the 
principle,  ~~ established  b,y  the original Chapter VI,  of prior 
authorization by  tJ.1e  Commission,  which must  verify  ~-:hether these exports 
are in conformity with the general  interests of the Community,  is retained. - 12-
Furthermore,  an analysis of the  exceptions which  beset  this principle 
under the present  s,yst~:1  and  which  are  justified by  the  existence of 
the monopoly  led the  Co~~ission to  conclude that,  if such  exceptions 
were  maintained  under the  neH  system,  they would result in confused 
situations,  since,  in certain cases,  authorization by the Commission 
for the  export  of  s~~sitive materials would not  be required. 
It is consequently proposed that the  scope of the authorization be 
extended to all expor-ts  so  as to  ensure that,  under all  circumstances, 
they will be  compatible with the general interests of the Community. 
32.  The  purpose of  these measures is to  improve  supply  conditions both 
as regards all the producers  and users in the  Community  taken together 
and  in respect  of  each  of them  as  an  individual  in the  event  of  serious 
difficulties arising which hinder the provision of regular  and  equitable 
supplies for  all users. 
To  this end,  the Commission proposes that: 
a  consultative mechanism  be  established at Community  level for the 
purpose of facilitating preferential  access of the Community  partners 
to investments in industrial-scale installations for the processing 
of nuclear materials; 
the option of Community  financial  participation in uranium prospecting 
prograrn.mes  in the territories of the .Member  States be maintained  and 
expanded to  include participation in prospecting programmes  in the 
territories of  non-Community  countries; 
consideration be  given to building up  decentralized  emergency  stocks 
to be held  by  the :Member  States,  producers or users,  who  would  be 
obliged to  do  so  by  a  Community  Act  to that  effect; 
in the  event  of imbalance  between  supply  and  demand  which is such as 
to affect regular  ar~ equitable  supplies within the Community,  the 
Council  adoRt  ~easures relating to  prices,  to determination of the 
geograpnical  origin of the  supplies and  to the establishment  of  quotas 
for imports  from  outside the Community. 
·33.  Despite revo::ation of the  commercial  ~onopoly, the prov1s1ons 
governing the  establishment  and functioning of tbe  Agency  are not 
substantially different  from  those under the present  syste~. 
As  reg-ards  its neH  -';;asks,  it is laid down  that the  .Agency  shall: 
(a)  re:ceive  coru:a1.:nication  of all contracts concernir:g  supplies,  after 
their conclusion,  and verify that  they  are in conformity  ·  .. ;i  th the 
nc~ provisions or  Cnapter.  VI; - 13-
(b)  make  every effort to ensure transparency of the market,  parti.;...ula.rly 
on the basis of the  information contained in such contracts and CJ 
carrying out market  surveys; 
(c)  make  every effort to  improve the  conditions of supply,  in particular 
by  endeavouring to forestall  situations of imbalance  between  supply 
and  demand  within the Community; 
'' 
(d)  accomplish the tasks assigned to it by the Commission,  in particular 
those relati!l€ to the  implementation of Community  solidarity 
measures; 
{e)  conclude supply  contracts in cases where proV1SJ.on is made for  Sl!ch 
action by  an international  agreement  concluded  by the Community. 
The  Agency  ma.y  also act  in the  capacity of adviser to operators who 
subnit to it on  an optional  basis their draft contracts before they are 
signed. 
This  advisory  function  will  only  be  able  however  to  cover  conformity  of  the 
provisions  of  contracts  with  the  rules  of  Community  Law,  to  the  exclusion 
of  those  aspects  of  contracts  which  are  completely  commercial  or  industrial. 
34..  Bearing in mind  the fact that the work  of the .Agency  can never  be 
fully effective without  close cooperation •-lith the producers  and  users, 
the Commission proposes that the new  provisions of Chapter VI  confirm 
the existence and the tasks of the Advisory Committee of the  Agency, 
composed  of representatives of the operators and  of highly qualified 
governmental  experts in the field of nuclear supplies. 
35.  In order to ensure compliance with the new  proViSJ.ons,  it is 
proposed that an arrangement  along the following lines be  adopted: 
as regards  supervision 
v  post facto  communication to the  Agency  of every detail of all 
supply  contracts Hithin 15  da.ys  of their conclusion;  if no 
objections are rai9ed by the Commission  (before which the  Agency 
would place the matter in accordance with appropriate internal 
procedures) Hithin a  period  of one month,  or if the Commission's 
objections are  withdraHn,  or if the contract is amended  in 
accordance  with the Commission's request,  such contracts shall  be 
deemed  to  be  in conformity with the new  provisions of Chapter VI; 
•  verifications in respect of persons  and firms,  to be decided  on 
case  ~J case  by  the Commission,  for the purpose of ensuring that 
the abovementioned obligation to  communicate contracts is fulfilled 
as regards  s~~ctic~s 
contracts  which  are contrary to the provisions 
of the new Chapter VI to be declared null and  void  • 
.J - 14-
•  fines  and  penalty  p~ents to be determined  b,y  an  ad  hoc  Commission 
Regulation. 
36.  It  ~ould also  be  advisable to  stipulate that  conformity  of behaviour 
of the  l'~erncer  States (apart  from  the  conclusion by  them  of  supply 
contracts >-;here  necessary)  with the provisions of Chapter VI  Hould 
continue to  be  supervised,  as  in the original  ~stem, by  means  of the 
normal  procedures  laid dm:n  by  the Treaty  (in particular the procedure 
in respect  of  infringements  set  out  in Articles  141  et  secr.). 
37.  The  provisions in question have  been  t~~en over from  the existing 
~stem and  concern the  exclusion from  the application of Chapter VIII 
(the Community's right of  o~Tiership) of materials being processed in 
the  Community  1r1hich  have  come  from  out side the Community  and  are to  be 
returned to their original  m·:ners  and  the non-application of the  new 
provisions of Chapter VI  to  small  quanti  ties of materials. 
38.  Finally,  the Commission has decided to  adopt  the principle 
established in the first  paragraph of  Article  76  of the original 
Chapter VI,  thus keeping open the option of having this Chapter revised 
subsequently on its ovm  initiative or on that of a  Member  State. 
0  0  0 COMMISSION 
OF  THE 
EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
Proposal for a  Council  Decision  adopting new  proV1s1ons 
relating to Chapter VI  "Supplies"  -- of the  Treaty establishing 
the European  Atomic Energy  Community. 
THE  COUNCIL  OF  THE  EU"ROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the  European  ATomic  Energy 
Community  and in particular Article 76,  second paragraph,  thereof; 
Having regard to the proposal  from  the  Commission; 
Having regard to the  opinion of the  European Parliament; 
Having regard to the  opinion of the  Economic  and Social  ~ommittee; 
Considering that Article  2  of the  Treaty  imposes  on the  Community, 
inter alia,  the  tasks  of ensuring that all users in the  Community 
receive  a  regular and equitable  supply of ores  and nuclear fuels  and 
of setting up  a  common  market  in these materials; 
Considering that in the  application of Chapter VI  of the Treaty the 
Community  has  to carry out  these  taSks  by the  action of the Supply 
Agen~y to which  is given the right of option  on  materials produced 
on  the  territories of Member  States and the  exclusive right to conclude 
contracts  and entraated,  by the exercise  thereof,  with  the  task of 
realising the principle  of equal access to resources and the pursuit 
of a  common  supply policy; 
Considerinq  that the  Treaty provides that seven years after its entry 
into force  the  provisions  of Chapter VI  may  be  confirmed or,  failing 
that,  amended  by the  Council; 
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Considering  that the  development  of the nuclear industry 
since  the entry into force  of the  Treaty no  longer requires 
that  there  be  a  monopoly  of supply vested in the  Community; 
Considering that in the  absence  of such monopoly the policies of 
the persons and undertakings  concerned as  w  11  as  those  of the 
Member  States need to be  reinforced and  coordinated and,  where 
appropriate,  supplemented by direct action on  the part of the 
Community; 
Considering  that  a  modified  role of  the  Community  in  the  matter 
of  supply  has  to  continue  to  ensure  the  implementation  of  the  tasks 
entrusted to  it under  article 2  through  a  common  supply  policy  based 
on  the  principe of the  unity  of  the  market,  providing  for  appropriate 
competences  for  the  Community  in external  relations  and  establishing 
the  framework  for  measures  of solidarity  and  active  intervention  by 
the  Community; 
Considering that the pursuit of these  aims entails, in order 
that they  be  met,  the  enactment  of appropriate  Treaty provisions 
to ensure  that  the  rules hereby laid down  are  observed; 
Considering that the  Council has not  confirmed the  original 
provisions  of Chapter VI; 
Considering that pursuant to Article 76  of the  Treaty the  government 
of the  French Republic made  a  request,  in July 1979,  for amendment 
of this Chapter; 
Considering accordingly that it is appropriate  to enact  such 
new  provisions; 
DECIDES  AS  POU.Oifi  1 
Article 1 
The  provisions of Chapter VI  of Ti-tle Two  of the  Treaty instituting 
the  European  Atomic Energy Community  shall be  replaced by the 
provisions set  out  in the  Annex to this Decision. - 3-
Article 2 
This Decision shall have  effect  3  months  after the  date 
of publication thereof in the Official Journal  of the  European 
Communities. 
~one at Brussels 
For the  Council 
PRESIDENT CA:D/V/l73/82~EN 
CHAPTER  VI 
SUPPLIE:i 
Article 52 
The  Community  shall ensure that all users  receive  a  regular and 
equitable  supply of ores,  source  materials  and  special fissile materials, 
hereinafter termed  "the materials"'  for civil  and non-e;z:ploa:ive 
purposes  ,  pursuant to the  provisions of this Chapter, by means  of 
a  common  policy based  on  the  principle of the unity of the  market 
and  covering,  in particular, the  conclusion by the  Community  of 
international  agreements  and  the  adoption of specific solidarity 
measures. 
A Supply Agency,  hereinafter termed  "the Agency",  shall contribute 
to the implementation of that·policy. 
SECTION  I 
The  unity of the  market 
Article  53 
1.  Without  prejudice to the  international  agreements  concluded by 
the  Community,  all restrictions on  the transfers of  materials 
within the  Community  and  on  imports from outside  the  Community  are 
prohibited together with any conditions governing use  and  storage within 
the  Community. 
2.  Without  prejudice  to the  provisions of Chapter IX,  the  Commission 
shall lay down,  in a  Regulation,  conditions relating to transfers of 
materials within the  Community  and  to imports  from  outside  the  Community 
together with conditions  governing use  and  storage within the  Community. 
The  Commissio~ shall inquire into any request made  by a  Member  State 
within three  months  of ite receipt.  The  said Regulation can  be 
referred to the  Council by  any Member  State within a  period of one  month -2-
of its publication !n the Official Journal of the European  Communities. 
!he Council,  within one  month  of the matter  being referred  ~o it, 
may  repeal  the  Commission  Regulation if acting by a  qualified majority 
or amend  it if acting unanimously. 
Article  54 
Articles 85  to 90  of the  Treaty establishing the European Economic  Community 
shall apply to those  restrictions,  conditions  and measures relating 
to supplies which  are not  mentioned in Article 53(1). 
SECTION II 
International Relations 
Article  55 
1.  The  Community shall conclude  international agreements  concerning 
supplies from  outside the  Community. 
2.  The  negotiation of the  agreements  referred  ~o in this Article shall 
beoonductedby the  Commission in accordance with the  procedure laid 
down  in the  second paragraph of Article 101  in consultation with a  special 
committee appointed  by the  Council to assist it in that task. 
Article 56 
If no  appropriate  agreement  between  the  Community  and  the  third State 
concerned exists and  subject to the  application of Article 103, 
the  Commission  shall authorize  a  Xember  State to conclude  an  agreement 
for the  purpose  referred to in Article 55. 
The  possibility  for the  Community  to assume  the 
rights and  obligations  arising  from  that  agreement  must  be  ensured. 
Article  57 
All  exports of materials from  the  Community  shall be  subject  to authorization 
by the  Commission,  which  shall verify whether  those exports are in 
conformity with the general interests of the  Community. 
Authorization by the  Commission  may  be  made  subject to conditions. 3 -
SECTION  III 
Solidarity Measures 
Without  prejudice  to  the  provisions of  Chapter IV,  persons  and  undertakings 
shall  communic~te to the  Commission  in good  time  all plans for the 
construction within the  Community  of any industrial-scale nuclear 
installation for the processing of materials which involve the  formation 
of links with  other investors in the  Community. 
After informing the  persons  and undertakings  concerned  of  such  plans  in 
accordance with procedures which,  where  necessary,  shall safeguard 
their confidentiality,  the  Commission  shall facilitate the  formation 
of appropriate links. 
Article  59 
1.  Within the  limits set by the budget,  the  Commission  m~  give financial 
support to prospecting programmes  in the territories of Member  States 
and the territories of third States. 
Every two  years,  the  Commission  shall submit to the  Council  and the 
Assembly  a  report  on  the  state of progress  of such  support  and  on 
the  forecasts  for the  four  coming years,  particularly with regard to 
the  financial  aspects. 
2.  The  Member  States shall  submit  annually to the  Commission  a  report 
on  the  development  of prospecting and  production,  on  probable  reserves 
and  on  investment in mining which has been  made  or is planned in their 
territories. 
Article  60 
1.  The  Council,  acting by a  qualified majority on  a  proposal  from  the 
Commission  and  after consulting the  Assembly,  m~  decide to build up 
stocks  and  establish the  levels thereof in accordance  with the  procedures 
that it layB  down. - "t-
These  stocks  may  receive financial  support  from  the  Community  in 
accordance  with  the  same  procedure. 
2.  The  Council,  acting in accordance  with the  conditions laid down  in 
paragraph  (1)  above,  may  establish procedures Which  provide for the 
use  of such stocks. 
Article  61 
1.  In the event  of an  imbalance between supply and  demand  such as 
to affect regular and  equitable supplies to all users in the  Community, 
the  Council,  acting by a  qualified majority on  a  propos~ from  the 
Commission  and after consulting the  Assembly,  may  decide  as follows: 
(a)  on  appropriate  measures  with  regard to prices; 
(b)  on  the  geographical origin of the  supplies; 
{c)  on the establishment of quotas for imports  from  outside  the  Community. 
2.  The  Commission  shall make" all appropriate  recommendations  to the  Member  Stae! 
persons  and  undertakings  with a  view to promoting a  balance between 
supply and demand  within the  Community. 
Article  62 
Should the  measures referred to in Article  61  above  prove  to be 
inadequate,  the  Co moil,  acting unanimously on  a  proposal  from  the 
Commission  and  after consulting the  Assembly,  may  adopt  any other 
appropriate  measure. 
Article  63. 
The  Commission  shall ensure  that the  measures  referred to in this Section 
are  implemented.  For this purpose,  it may  call upon  the  assistance of 
the  Agency. 
SECTION IV 
Article  64 
1.  An  Agency  is hereby established  and  placed under  the  supervision of 
the  Co~ission, which  shall issue directives to it, possess  a  right  of 
veto over its decisions  and  appoint its Director-General and  Deputy Director-Genera -5-
2.  Any  act  performed by the  Agency  in the exercise of its functions 
may be  referred by the parties concerned to the  Commission,  which  shall 
give  a  decision thereon within one  month. 
Article  65 
1.  The  Agency shall have  legal personality and financial autonomy. 
The  Council shall  1~  down  the statutes of the  Agency,  acting by a 
qualified majority on  a  proposal  from the  Commission  and after consulting 
the  Assembly. 
The  statutes may  provide  for  a  charge  on transactions to  defr~ the 
gperating expenses  of the  Agency. 
The  statutes  m~  determine  the  Agency's  capital and the terms upon which 
it is to be  subscribed.  The  major part of the capital shall always  belong 
to the  Community  and  to the  Member  States.  The  contributions to the 
capital shall be  determined by  common  accord of the Member  States. 
The  statutes may  be  amended  in accordance  with the procedure described 
in the  second indent of this paragraph. 
2.  An  Advisory Committee  for the Agency  is hereby  esta~limhed which 
shall be  formed  of representatives of the  producers  and users  and  of 
highly qualified experts in the field of nuclear supplies.  The  statutes 
of the  Agency  shall determine  the  rules governing the  composition and 
procedures of the  Committee. 
Article 66 
Pursuant to the  provisions  of this Chapter,  the  Agency  shall: 
(a)  receive  communications  on all contracts concerning supplies and verify 
whether they are  in conformity with the provisions of this Chapter; - 6-
·  (b)  make  every  effort to  ensure transparency of the market,  in  part~cular on 
the basis of the information contained in such contracts and  by  carrying 
. out  market  surveys; 
{c)  make  every effort to improve the conditions of supply,  in particular by 
doing its utmost  to forestall situations of imbalance between  supply and 
demand  within the Community; 
{d)  fulfil the tasks assigned to it by the  Commission, in particular by 
implementing the measures adopted pursuant to Section III of this Chapter; 
(e)  conclude the contracts referred to in Article 69. 
Article 67 
The  Agency  shall inform,  advise and assist the producers and users. 
It ~  promote  concerted action intended to improve supplies,  in particular 
by forestalling situations of imbalance between  supply and  demand  within the 
Community. 
It shall keep the Commission  informed of its activities and shall  submit  to 
it  any  appropriate  suggestion. 
Article 68 
The  Agency  shall regularly carry out  market  surveys concerning the requirements 
of the users within the  Community  for materials and the prospects of covering 
these requirements,  in particular at  Community  Level, and  shall publish the 
results of  such surveys. 
Article 69 
The  Agency  shall conclude contracts concerning  supplies if provision is made 
to this effect in an  international agreement  concluded by the Community. - 7 -
Article 70 
1.  The  Member  States shall be  responsible for ensuring that  the Agency  may 
operate freely in their territories. 
2.  The  Rember  States,  persons and  undertakings  shall  regularly  communicate  to  the 
Agency  all the information necessary to  enable it to discharge its duties, 
in particular  that  relating to nuclear programmes,  the requirements for 
materials arising from  them  and the market  situation. 
Article 71 
A Commission  Regulation  shall establish the procedures for applying this 
Section. 
SECTION  V 
Special  provisions 
Article 72 
1.  All  contracts relating to supply which  impede  the application of the 
provisions of Article  53,  those of an international agreement  concluded by 
the  Community  or those laid down  pursuant  to Section III of this Chapter 
shall be automatically void  • 
2.  All contracts concerning  supply shall be  communicated  by the contracting 
parties to the  Agency  within fifteen days  of their having  been  concluded so 
that their conformity with the provisions referred to in paragraph (1)  above 
can be  verified~ 
3.  If a  contract  which  has  been  communicated  purSUllll!Lt  to paragraph  ( 2)  above 
impede  the application of the provisions referred tQ  in paragraph (1)  above, 
the  Commission  shall  make  its comments  to those concerned within one  month  of 
receipt  of the contract. 
If the objections of the  Commission  are not  withdrawn',  the contract  must  be 
amended  in accordance lot'i th the comments  of the Commi:ssion  within a  period which 
it shall determine. - 8-
4.  The  contract  shall be deemed to be in conformity with the provisions 
referred to in paragraph (1)  above: 
- if the Commission  makes  no  comments; 
- if the objections by the  Commission  have been  satisfed; 
- if the contract  has been amended  in accordance with the Commission's  comments .. 
Article 73 
1.  In order to  ensure that the obligation deriving from  p&r&«'l'aph  ( 2)  of 
Article 72 is fulfilled,  the Commission  m~  decide to verify whether persons or  un-
dertakh~ are  complying with the provisions of that  paragraph. 
2.  On  presentation of a  document  establishing their status,  the officials 
responsible for verifying compliance  m~, to the extent necessary for the 
accomplishment  of their task: 
(a)  examdne  any books  or other business document  together with the accounts; 
(b)  have copies of or extracts from  such documents  made  available to them; 
{c)  request  additional verbal information; 
(d)  enter any premises,  sites and means  of transport  belonging to persons or 
/  undertakings. 
3.  The  officials of the competent  authority of the :Member  State within the 
terri  tory of which  compliance must  be verified lllaJr  at the request of that 
authority or of the Commission,  assist the  Commission  officials in the 
accomplishment  of their tasks. 
4.  Where  a  person or  undertaking  objects  to  a  verification operation  decided on 
pursuant  to paragraph (1)  above,  the Member  State concerned shall give every 
assistance to the  Commission  officials responsible for verification of 
compliance which is necessary to the accomplishment  of their task. - 9 -
Article 74 
In the event  orl~nfringement by persons or undertakings  of  the  provisions  of  this 
Chapter,  in·~luding those of international agreements concluded by the  Community, 
the Commission  may  impose  fines and penalty payments. 
The  Court  of Justice  shall have unlimited jurisdiction in respect  of P.roceedings 
.  instituted 
by  persons  and  undertakings  against the sanctions imposed upon  them pursuant 
to this Article. 
The procedures for  applying this Article shall be  laid down  in a  Commission 
Regulation. 
Article 75 
1.  The  provisions of  Chapter VIII  shall not  apply to materials which are 
processed  ~~thin the  Community  where  such materials have  come  from  outside 
the Community  and  are then to be returned either to the original person or underta-
king  or to any other consignee outside the  Community  designated by  such person or 
under-
taking.  However,  these materials shall be  subject  in the territories of the 
Member  States to the safeguards laid down  in Chapter VII. 
2.  The  Commission  mavr  exempt  small quantities of materials  such as are 
normaLLy  used  in  research from  the application of this Chapter. 
Article 76 
en  the initiative of a  Member  State or of the Commission,  the Council  may, 
acting unanimously  on  a  proposal from the  Commission  and after consulting 
the Assembly,  amend  the provisions of this Chapter.  The  Commission  shall 
inquire into any request  made  by a  Member  State. 